Weighing what's practical by Ahmed, Akhter U. & Bouis, Howarth E.
 
Discussion Paper 132 
Weighing What’s Practical: Proxy Means Testing for 
Targeting Food Subsidies in Egypt 
Akhter U. Ahmed and Howarth E. Bouis 
 
gypt’s current system of food subsidies has generally 
been effective as a social safety net. However, the 
cost of the system is still high relative to the benefits 
received by the poor because the system does not target the 
poor well and considerable portions of the benefits are 
misappropriated. As a result, only one-third of the benefits 
goes to the poorest 40 percent of the population. The 
Egyptian government is now considering whether to reform 
the food subsidy system in ways that reduce benefits to the 
nonneedy while continuing to protect the poor. There is 
scope for better targeting food subsidies, in particular those 
for rationed cooking oil and sugar, because reforms in this 
area are perceived to be far less politically sensitive than 
adjusting subsidy policies for bread and wheat flour. This 
paper develops and evaluates a “practical” proxy means test-
ing method of identifying needy and nonneedy households, 
which the government could use to implement such reform.  
 
The Ration Card Subsidy System 
About three-fourths of the Egyptian population hold ration 
cards that guarantee a monthly quota of sugar and c ooking 
oil at subsidized prices. Consumers holding ration cards buy 
subsidized sugar and oil from private grocers who also sell 
unsubsidized consumer goods. There are two categories of 
ration cards, green and red. The green card has a high rate of 
subsidy  for low-income families, while the red card has a 
low rate of subsidy intended for people with higher incomes. 
 
The Policy Issue 
The problem is that the current ration card system is very 
loosely targeted in the sense of providing subsidies to the 
poor. A  majority of wealthy Egyptians carry the high-
subsidy green ration cards rather than the low-subsidy red 
cards, while some of the poorest Egyptians hold red cards or 
no cards. A policy reform might seek to transfer nonpoor 
consumers from the high-
subsidy green card to the low-
subsidy red card and poor 
consumers from the low-
subsidy red card to the high-
subsidy green card. Simul-
taneously, the policy would 
bring the poor who currently 
do not hold any ration card 
into the green card system. This demonstration of the 
government’s desire to provide a ration-card safety net to the 
poor who have slipped through the system could enhance the 
political feasibility of the reform. Moreover, conversion of 
red cards to green cards for poor families would mitigate 
public criticism that the reform is aimed mainly at reducing 
overall subsidy costs. 
 
Identifying the Poor and Nonpoor 
In any targeting effort, of course, the major challenge is 
identifying eligible and ineligible households accurately and 
cost effectively. In general, it is true that the per capita 
income of a household can be considered an accurate 
measure of its welfare. And, in the case of Egypt, the 
standard application form for ration cards records self-
reported incomes of household members. Cardholders, 
however, have an incentive to understate their incomes if 
they wish to qualify for the subsidy benefits. In addition, 
verifying income is difficult in Egypt because of the 
difficulty of documenting level and sources of income of 
household members. Finally, because measurement of 
household income or expenditure requires expensive and 
time-consuming surveys, such measures of welfare are rarely 
used to determine eligibility or benefit levels. 
An alternative method—and the one tested in this 
paper—measures household welfare through a “proxy means 
test.” Instead of asking about income directly, the approach 
relies on indicators that are highly correlated with household 
income yet are easy to collect, observe, and verify.  
 
Developing the Proxy Means Test 
An IFPRI research team in Egypt, in collaboration with the 
Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Supply, developed a proxy 
means test model for targeting ration cards. The model used 
the data set from the IFPRI-led 1997 Egypt Integrated 
Household Survey (EIHS), a nationally representative survey 
that included 2,500 urban and rural households from 20 of 
the country’s 26 governorates. The EIHS collected 
information on a wide variety of topics, including use of the 
food subsidy system by households. 
Per capita consumption ex-
penditure was chosen as the most 
reliable measure of household wel-
fare for two reasons. First, con-
sumption expenditures are likely to 
reflect permanent income and are, 
therefore, a better indicator of con-
sumption behavior. Second, data 
on consumption expenditure are 
generally more reliable and stable than income data.  
In selecting the proxy means test indicators, explanatory 
variables were selected that were statistically significant in 
“explaining” per capita household consumption. These 
variables would be easy to record and verify by field staff 
and are politically acceptable. 
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This paper describes the process of 
moving from the “optimal” consumption-
predicting model of identifying the needy 
to a “practical” model that is both 
administratively and politically feasible.  
For predicting household welfare using per capita 
expenditure, we selected a large number of variables from 
the EIHS data set that we expected to be correlated with per 
capita household consumption. These variables can be broad-
ly classified into seven categories: household demographic 
make-up, education, utility use, dwelling characteristics, 
ownership of assets, occupation, and location variables. 
With extensive input from a stakeholder task force, the 
model was revised many times to drop a number of statis-
tically significant variables that would require calculations 
by field staff (and hence could increase calculation errors), 
would require judgment of field staff to define, or w ould 
require more resources to gather, or were politically 
unfeasible to collect. Eventually, a model was developed that 
included just nine household-level variables.  
 
Assessing the Predictive Power of the Model 
For evaluating the performance of the proxy means test 
model, the authors considered 36.5 percent of the population 
as needy and 63.5 percent as nonneedy (based on the 1997 
EIHS data). A comparison of the results from the model to 
those of the EIHS data suggests that the model correctly 
predicts 71.8 percent of the actual needy, while misidentify-
ing 28.2 percent of the actual needy as nonneedy. In other 
words, the error of exclusion is 28.2 percent. On the other 
hand, the error of inclusion—nonneedy inaccurately 
predicted as needy—was only 16.3 percent. 
The authors also assessed the situation if there were no 
error of exclusion (i.e., 100 percent of the actual needy are 
included). The results of this assessment indicate that the 
error of inclusion in such a situation increases from 16.3 to 
33.6 percent. Moreover, 57.8 percent of total population is 
included as needy. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
Ration cards can be made more progressive by converting 
green ration cards of nonneedy households to red cards, 
converting red cards of needy households to green cards, and 
providing green cards to needy households without cards. 
This reform of the Egyptian ration card food subsidy system 
would require identification of both needy and nonneedy 
households, something that is not always easy. To effectively 
implement a targeted program, it would be necessary to rely 
on a method such as proxy means testing. 
In developing a proxy means testing method, this paper 
describes the process of creating a model that is both admini-
stratively and politically feasible. Targeting ration cards 
either through the “technically optimal” model or through the 
selected “practical” model would have differential impacts 
on consumers and subsidy costs. 
An effective and full implementation of targeting ration 
card subsidies through the selected “practical” proxy means 
testing model would yield the following results:  
 
•  Forty-eight percent of the high-subsidy green ration 
cards would be converted to low-subsidy red ration 
cards, saving the government about LE 98 million 
annually.  
•  Forty-three percent of the red ration cards would be 
converted to high-subsidy green ration cards, creating 
an additional cost of about LE 16 million. 
•  Thirty-two percent of households who currently do 
not hold any ration cards would receive green ration 
cards, costing about LE 51 million annually. 
 
This redistribution of ration cards would increase the 
equity in the ration card food subsidy system and benefit the 
poor. At the same time, the total annual cost of rationed food 
subsidies would decline by about LE 31 million. The 
“technically optimal” model could generate even greater 
annual savings to the government. However, taking into 
consideration the administrative and political difficulties, the 
“practical” model might nevertheless be the better choice. 
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